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The purpose of the present paper is to shed some light on why Portuguese banks hold 
significant capital buffers above the required regulatory minimum, through the 
estimation of a dynamic panel data model. 
The main findings are that the capital buffer is positively influenced by several broad 
risk measures, suggesting that the introduction of the more sensitive regulation in 
Basel II might not affect Portuguese banks’ capital ratios as much as one could expect. 
Provisions and high and stable profitability are found to be substitutes for capital 
buffers, whereas larger banks seem to hold less excess capital. A negative business 
cycle effect is also found, and several other hypotheses are tested. 
Keywords: Banking; Excess Capital; Risk; Panel Data 
JEL: G21; G28; C23 
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1. Introduction 
Since the mid 1980’s, there has been an increasing effort to decrease the distortionary 
effects of excessive regulation in the Portuguese banking sector, following the 
revolution and nationalization of Portuguese banks. However, it was not until the early 
1990’s that credit ceilings were abolished and deposit rates were fully liberalized. This 
period has also hosted full entry liberalization and the beginning of privatizations, 
which lasted until 1996. Hence, during the early 1990’s, the Portuguese banking sector 
has met greater sophistication through market segmentation, risk differentiation and 
increased competition, which allowed for considerable efficiency gains. 
In this context of decreasing direct controls on banks’ conduct, capital adequacy 
regulation has become relatively more important. Hence, as established in the 1988 
Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), each bank is required to hold at least 8% of its Risk 
Weighted Assets (RWA) in capital. However, most banks’ solvency ratios are well 
above the regulatory minimum and a better understanding of the determinants of these 
capital buffers in the context of the present regulation may shed some light on the 
relevance and desirability of the more sophisticated and risk sensitive regulation 
proposed in Basel II
1. On the other hand, it may make it easier to assess the factors 
underlying banks’ solvency ratios. 
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some hypotheses to be 
examined; section 3 summarizes previous empirical findings on the subject; section 4 
presents the data; section 5 presents the model to be estimated; section 6 discusses 
estimation issues; section 7 presents the estimation results and section 8 concludes. 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the adoption of Basel II rules in Portugal, refer to Box 4.2 in Banco de Portugal’s 
Financial Stability Report for 2006.   3 
2. Hypotheses 
The reasoning behind capital adequacy regulation is that banks should hold enough 
capital in order to assure that failure risk is minimal. This is important due to the 
negative externalities bank failures impose on their depositors and the potential for 
moral hazard in the behaviour of limited liability stockholders, but especially due to the 
possibility of generating systemic risk with severe effects to the real economy
2. 
In this context, since the current solvency regulation is generally acknowledged to have 
poor risk sensitivity
3, one would expect banks with higher risk to hold higher capital 
buffers. On the other hand, the literature suggests that capital is a relatively expensive 
source of financing when compared to deposits or bonds
4. Hence, banks’ capital 
decisions reflect the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of holding excess 
capital (Milne and Whalley 2001). 
One of the main benefits of holding high capital buffers is lower failure costs due to a 
decrease in the probability of failure. On the other hand, a decrease in the capital ratio 
below the regulatory minimum would imply extra supervisory scrutiny which would in 
turn decrease bank value. Furthermore, adjustments to the capital level bare direct costs, 
i.e. the transaction costs of issuing and repurchasing shares, as well as indirect costs 
from the signals they send to markets – issuing new shares may be interpreted as a 
signal that shares are overvalued
5. Dietrich and Vollmer (2004) argue that banks use 
excess capital as a strategic tool which provides banks with increased bargaining power 
when renegotiating loans. In the context of asymmetric information, strong solvency 
ratios may also be interpreted as a signal of the bank’s low probability of failure. Hence, 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive discussion on the relevance of financial stability see Crockett, A. (1997). 
3 See BCBS (1999). 
4 Check Myers and Majluf (1984). 
5 Cornett and Tehranian (1994) report statistically significant negative share price reactions to 
announcements of equity issues in the banking industry.   4 
higher solvency ratios allow for better credit ratings, therefore decreasing the cost of 
financing and improving the bank’s image. In the presence of liquidity constraints, 
banks may also hold excess capital in order to provide for unexpected investment 
opportunities. 
According to the “too big to fail” hypothesis, larger banks feel that authorities would 
support them if they faced difficulties due to the important externalities and contagion 
risk their failure would pose. This moral hazard effect makes big banks willing to 
purchase less insurance against failure. On the other hand, if portfolio diversification 
increases with bank size and is not captured by the risk measures, larger banks are less 
likely to experience large drops in their capital ratios
6. One may also consider the costs 
and benefits of screening and monitoring borrowers in order to better acknowledge their 
risk. If there are scale economies in screening and monitoring, one would expect larger 
banks to choose relatively more of these activities to the detriment of excess capital. As 
Alfon et al. (2004) remark, big banks may also be less liquidity constrained and/or have 
smaller costs in adjusting capital to optimum levels and thus issue comparatively more 
capital or debt on demand rather than hold large capital reserves. 
3. Previous Empirical Findings 
There is an extensive literature regarding banks’ solvency. However, most of it regards 
US banks and capital ratios rather than excess capital. The literature on the determinants 
of European banks’ capital buffers includes Stolz and Wedow (2005) for German banks, 
Ayuso et al. (2002a) and Ayuso et al. (2002b) for Spanish banks and Lindquist (2003) 
for Norwegian banks. To our knowledge there is no such work for Portuguese banks. A 
dynamic model is estimated in the first three papers, whereas Lindquist (2003) does not 
                                                 
6 It is, however, important to note that Portuguese banks’ capital requirements are already adjusted for 
diversification.   5 
explicitly model for the persistence of the capital buffer, i.e. for adjustment costs in 
banks’ level of capital. 
The conclusions on the effect of risk on capital buffers vary somewhat between models. 
Ayuso et al. (2002a) find a negative influence of non performing loans on Spanish 
banks’ capital buffer, which the authors expected since this is an ex-post risk measure. 
Ayuso et al. (2002b) also find evidence of a negative relationship between non 
performing loans and excess capital. However, they also find a negative impact of the 
loan growth rate (which may be interpreted as a measure of banks’ willingness to 
increase portfolio risk) and a positive impact of the share of risk free assets to total 
assets. These results suggest the counter-intuitive interpretation that more risky banks 
tend to hold less insurance against default
7. Lindquist (2003), using a more 
sophisticated measure of risk but a less sophisticated modelling approach, also finds a 
negative risk effect which the author did not expect. Stolz and Wedow (2005) find a 
positive relationship between banks’ liquidity and excess capital, which the authors 
argue may be interpreted as a positive risk effect as they proxy liquidity by banks’ 
holdings of shares and bonds, and capital buffers may be held in order to hedge for the 
corresponding market risk. 
Ayuso et al. (2002a) and Ayuso et al. (2002b) find a negative effect of the price of 
insurance, proxied by banks’ Return on Equity (ROE), in capital buffers. Lindquist 
(2003) finds the same result using the β-coefficient for the Norwegian banking industry 
as a proxy for the cost of excess capital, since it is a measure of the industry level risk 
premium. Being an industry level variable, this proxy has the obvious shortcoming of 
allowing for no cross-section variation. Stolz and Wedow (2005) find a negative 
                                                 
7 Crocket, A (1997) presents potential explanations for this result, most of which are based on moral 
hazard in banks’ behaviour and the potential for regulatory arbitrage.   6 
relationship between banks’ Return on Assets (ROA) and excess capital, suggesting that 
banks with high returns may use profits to increase capital and therefore need to hold 
smaller capital buffers as insurance. 
The four papers find a negative relationship between the business cycle and capital 
buffers. From a regulator’s perspective this may seem like a reassuring result as banks 
seem to protect themselves with higher excess capital during downturns, when loan 
default rates are higher. On the other hand, banks may increase excess capital during 
downturns through changes in their portfolio in order to reduce the risk weighted assets 
on which the regulatory minimum level of capital is based
8. Hence, from a 
macroeconomic perspective, this behaviour may not be quite as desirable as it is likely 
to amplify rather than dampen business cycles, as during downturns firms are more 
likely to be denied credit (at a reasonable cost) which should increase bankruptcies. 
Stolz and Wedow (2005), Ayuso et al. (2002b) and Lindquist (2003) also find a 
negative effect of banks’ size on excess capital.  
Lindquist (2003) also finds a significant positive effect
9 of competitors’ capital buffers 
which is interpreted as evidence of peer pressure as banks use solvency in order to 
signal the market of their credibility. However, this result must be interpreted with 
caution, since Lindquist (2003) does not include the lagged dependent variable in the 
model, which in the presence of persistence in capital buffers may make inference 
invalid
10. 
                                                 
8 Furfine (2000) develops a structural dynamic model of a banking firm, finding evidence that US banks 
adjust their loan portfolios to capital shocks. 
9 In fact, the hypothesis that the corresponding elasticity equals one is not rejected. 
10 See Bond (2002), for instance.   7 
4. The Data 
Estimation in the present study is based on an unbalanced panel of yearly data from 
banks’ financial statements reported to Banco de Portugal, Statistical Bulletins issued 
by Banco de Portugal and Reuters. Consolidated figures are used (except for banks that 
do not belong to any banking group and thus do not consolidate their data and variables 
for which data is only available on an individual basis
11) as capital requirements are 
imposed at the consolidated group level. The dataset used for estimation covers 17 
Portuguese banks from 1994 to 2004, though profitability data since 1993 was used. 
The choice of the period for analysis was made with the purpose of maximizing the 
number of observations while avoiding structural changes in the industry. Hence, by 
1994 Portuguese banks had adapted to the regulatory framework developed in Basel I 
but by 2004 they had not yet started to adapt to the new Basel II rules. The first three 
observations of newly created banks were excluded in order to allow for some 
stabilization of their activity. Small banks specialized in investment banking were also 
excluded as they are likely to behave differently. 
The capital buffer (BUF) is defined as the ratio between excess capital and the 
regulatory minimum. NPL1 is the ratio of non-performing loans overdue for less than 
one year to total loans and CREDG is the growth rate of total loans. PROV is the 
coverage ratio of non-performing loans by specific provisioning. ROE and ROA are 
each bank’s Return on Equity and Return on Assets, whereas CF is banks’ cash flow 
normalized by total assets. The variance of profits (VPROF) is the variance of banks’ 
past ROA and is computed using profits from the previous three years to the current 
year in order to obtain a meaningful measure of volatility while minimising the loss of 
observations. For the same reason, profitability data since 1993 is used. STK is the 
                                                 
11 For these variables, group level data is obtained by adding data for each of its members.   8 
weight of volatile income financial assets in banks’ total assets and MKTD is the ratio 
of market debt (total liabilities deducted of deposits) to total liabilities. TIER1 is the 
ratio of Tier 1 to total own funds. Banks’ size (SIZE) is measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets. PSIG is the change in the Lisbon Stock Exchange general 
index and is thus constant across banks. YGAP is a simple output gap measure obtained 
through the application of a Hodrick-Precott filter to the real output series.
12 Since this 
filter is known to have a poor fit for the first and the last observation, it was applied to 
an output series covering more years than the sample. YGAP is defined as the ratio of 
output gap to potential output. MERGER is a dummy variable equal to one when a bank 
has been involved in a merger. Ratios and growth rates are defined in percentage points. 
Descriptive statistics of the included variables are presented in Table 1 below and the 
correlation matrix is in the Appendix. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BUFi,t-1 152 46.297 37.591 1.180 208.430
NPL1i,t 152 1.046 0.942 0.000 7.076
PROVi,t 148 65.626 15.407 0.000 100.000
CREDGi,t 135 19.313 28.757 -51.660 148.769
STKi,t 152 2.902 2.526 0.009 12.153
SIZEi,t 152 15.425 1.598 11.561 18.122
YGAPt 187 0.588 2.430 -2.378 4.392
ROAi,t 162 0.873 1.437 -0.080 10.970
CFi,t 152 2.197 2.260 0.100 17.050
VPROFi,t 111 0.212 0.721 0.000 4.421
PSIGt 187 11.627 23.895 -20.700 65.200
PSIG*STKi,t 152 32.514 113.030 -180.393 792.372
ROEi,t 152 9.186 6.490 -4.154 32.791
TIER1i,t 152 74.982 13.722 50.000 100.000
MKTDi,t 152 42.554 24.492 11.006 100.000
MKTD*SIZEi,t 152 642.570 326.752 162.142 1363.399
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
NOTE: ROA covers the  period 1993-2004 while the remaining variables cover 1994-2004  
                                                 
12 The Hodrick-Prescott filter was implemented using the Stata command hprescott8.   9 
Untabulated results indicate that the average capital buffer for the largest banks (4
th 
quartile of total assets) is little above a third of the average buffer for the smallest banks 
in the sample (1
st quartile of total assets). 
As seen in Figure 1 below, the in-sample aggregate capital buffer tends to be lower than 
the banking system’s actual capital buffer. This difference may be explained by the fact 
that the banks that were eliminated from the sample – newly created banks and 
institutions with very specific activities – tend to have abnormally high levels of excess 
capital.  
From the beginning of the sample to the end of the past decade, capital buffers have 
declined as the economy recovered from the 1993 recession, credit accelerated and 
decreased exchange rate risk due to the adoption of the Euro was anticipated. 
Furthermore, there was an historical excess of capital in the Portuguese banking system, 
and rationalization of its use increased during this period. From the turning of the 
millennium, as capital ratios approached the regulatory minimum and economic growth 
slowed down, the banking system’s aggregate capital buffer initiated a slow and steady 
recovery. 







1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
%
Sample System
   10 
5. The Model 
Considering the small size of the available sample, which makes it impossible to 
estimate a comprehensive general model, the option was to estimate a parsimonious 
model and then test additional hypotheses on the initial specification presented below: 
01 1 2 3 1 it it it it it BUF BUF NPL PROV CREDG ββ ββ − =+ ++ +  
45 6 7 it it t it i it STK SIZE YGAP MERGER βββ β δη ε ++ + + + + +  
where δ is a constant term, ηi is an unobservable variable that captures idiosyncratic 
features of each institution that are constant over time and εi,t is a random shock 
The lagged dependent variable is intended to capture capital buffers’ persistence. As 
argued by Ayuso et al. (2002a) and Ayuso et al. (2002b), its coefficient may be 
interpreted as a measure of adjustment costs in capital buffers and its expected sign is 
thus positive. NPL1 is a credit risk measure that intends to capture the flow rather than 
the stock of non-performing loans, thus decreasing (but not fully eliminating) the ex-
post character of this variable. Hence, β1’s sign should depend on how much lag it has. 
If it still measures ex-post risk, a negative sign is expected as banks where higher credit 
risk has materialized are expected to have lower excess capital. If, on the other hand, it 
is a forward looking risk measure, and since the current solvency regulation is known to 
have poor risk sensitivity, one would expect a positive sign as banks with higher credit 
risk should, ceteris paribus, be willing to purchase more insurance. 
The coverage of non-performing loans by provisioning is expected to have a negative 
effect as banks that have already provisioned for more of their overdue credit should 
(1)   11 
require smaller capital buffers. Provisions are thus imperfect substitutes for capital as 
they are intended to cover expected rather than unexpected losses. 
The high credit growth observed during the sample period may have contributed to 
decrease capital buffers through a direct effect if banks have not anticipated this growth. 
On the other hand, one would expect a positive effect if banks anticipated high credit 
growth and responded to it with a precautionary excess capital increase. Furthermore, 
since an increase in granted loans is not expected to materialize immediately in an 
increase in non-performing loans, controlling for credit growth may be important for a 
correct interpretation of NPL1. 
Banks with a higher weight of stocks in their total assets are expected to hold higher 
capital buffers as their assets should be more volatile. As argued above, both banks’ size 
and the output gap are expected to have a negative impact on excess capital. 
A negative coefficient on MERGERi,t would suggest mergers consume capital, whereas 
a positive sign could be explained by precautionary behaviour or simply by the 
acquisition of a strongly capitalised bank. 
5.1. Additional variables tested 
a)  ROAi,t/CFi,t  and VPROFi,t 
High and stable earnings are expected to decrease the level of excess capital as profits 
are the first line of defence against unexpected losses. 
b)  PSIGt 
Good stock market performance should increase capital buffers as banks tend to choose 
these times to issue new capital and the value of banks’ capital should increase due to   12 
the likely increase in listed banks’ share price and the increase in profits from stock 
holdings. Hence, the hypothesis that the stock market effect is stronger for banks with a 
higher weight of shares in their assets is also tested. 
c)  ROEi,t 
Higher cost of capital, proxied by banks’ Return on Equity (ROE), is expected to have a 
negative impact in capital buffers. 
d)  TIER1i,t 
Banks with a higher ratio of Tier 1 to total own funds are expected to require smaller 
capital buffers as this ratio may not fall below 50%. Hence, for banks close to the 
minimum, a negative shock to Tier 1 capital will have a higher impact in the capital 
ratio as Tier 2 capital will also decrease. Furthermore, banks close to the minimum 
allowed ratio should have higher capital adjustment costs as supplementary capital is 
cheaper and faster to issue than core capital. These effects should be reflected in capital 
buffers as they are not considered in the definition of the regulatory minimum capital. 
e)  MKTDi,t 
Higher weight of market debt (total liabilities deducted of deposits) in total liabilities is 
expected to positively influence capital buffers as, on the one hand, banks should hedge 
for the increased exposure to liquidity risk and to changes in market sentiment, and on 
the other hand, banks with higher market debt should target higher credit ratings as the 
price of issued bonds depends on the issuer’s rating
13. 
                                                 
13 The importance of rating targets had been acknowledged in Ayuso et al. (2002b) but, to our knowledge, 
had not been explicitly tested.   13 
6. Methodology 
The main advantages of using panel data are capturing both cross-section and 
time-series variation as well as allowing for meaningful inference using a sample with a 
relatively small number of cross-section observations over a short time period. 
Allowing for dynamics in the underlying process is relevant not only to infer on the 
persistence of the series but also to ensure that the estimates for other parameters are 
consistent. 
In the estimation of dynamic models with a small number of time-series observations 
such as the ones described above, traditional estimation methods result in inconsistent 
estimates. Maximum Likelihood estimators may be inconsistent if the distribution of the 
initial conditions is miss-specified
14. In fact, in panels with a small number of time-
series observations, this estimator’s attractive properties depend on quite strong and un-
testable assumptions. Direct Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation would also result 
in inconsistent estimates as  ,1 it BUF −  would be correlated with the error term 
,, () it i it v η ε =+  due to the presence of time invariant individual effects. The Within 
Groups estimator solves for this source of inconsistency as it eliminates the fixed effects 
by transforming the variables into deviations from their means:  
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14 See Bond (2002). 
(2) 
(3)   14 
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15. 
Application of OLS after taking first differences of the variables would still yield 
inconsistent estimates as the regressor  ,1 ,1 ,2 it it it BUF BUF BUF −− − Δ= − would be 
correlated with the error term ,, , 1 it it it εεε − Δ=− . This problem may, however, be solved 
by using Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) with instrumental variables that are both 
correlated with  ,1 it BUF − Δ  and orthogonal to  , it ε Δ , as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) build on this approach by developing an asymptotically 
efficient estimator in a General Method of Moments (GMM) framework, using an 
































Where rows correspond to the first-differenced equations for periods t=3,4,…,T for 
individual i. 
However, as Arellano and Bover (1995) remark, in the presence of persistence in the 
dependent variable, lagged levels produce weak instruments for differences. 
Nevertheless, assuming lagged differences are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, one 
may explore additional moment conditions by estimating level equations using lagged 
                                                 
15 See Nickel (1981) for details. 
(5)   15 
differences as instruments. This is the intuition behind System GMM proposed in 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and which basically consists in estimating a system of both 
difference and level equations using lagged levels to instrument differences and lagged 
differences to instrument levels. System GMM thus allows for increased efficiency, 
especially when the dependent variable is persistent, which is likely to be the case with 
capital buffers
16. 
There are one and two-step versions of this estimator. While the two-step version is 
asymptotically more efficient, its standard errors are known to be severely downward 
biased in finite samples
17. Hence the finite sample two-step covariance matrix 
correction developed in Windmeijer (2005) is used. 
















Table 2. Instruments Used
 
                                                 
16 The correlation matrix in the Appendix presents a correlation of around 0.8 between  , it BUF  and 
,1 it BUF − . 
17 See, for example, Bond and Windmeijer (2002).   16 
Table 2 summarises the instruments used and the underlying assumption on the 
correlation of each regressor with the error term. Conservative assumptions
18 have been 
made since they are relevant to the validity of the conclusions and not testable. 
The use of too many instruments relative to the number of cross-section observations is 
known to overfit endogenous variables, thus creating biased estimates. Hence, rather 
than using all available lags to instrument each variable, regressions were first estimated 
using one lag. The number of lags was then increased and the specification with the 
highest p-value for the Hansen J test of overidentifiyng restrictions was chosen. To 































implying the use of one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one 
instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance. 
7. Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents Blundell-Bond two-step finite sample covariance matrix corrected 
System GMM estimates for the model presented in section 5 and a reduced model 
(1.A). Estimation was carried out in Stata 8.0 using the xtabond2 routine developed in 
Roodman (2005). 
                                                 
18 Ayuso et al. (2002b), for instance, assume exogeneity of bank size. 
(6)   17 
0.260 (0.98) 0.396 (1.84)*
-11.478 (-1.64) -8.196 (-1.43)
-1.125 (-2.07)* -1.013 (-2.49)**
0.249 (0.78)  
11.457 (1.97)* 16.315 (2.03)*
-20.989 (-2.69)** -21.193 (-4.49)***
-2.372 (-2.92)*** -2.089 (-2.73)**
-6.440 (-0.60) 3.136 (0.39)
409.801 (2.55)** 387.258 (4.88)***
NOTES: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
p-values are reported for the Hansen, AR(1), AR(2) and F tests
***, ** and * indicate statistical signifficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence 
level, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test.


















Model (1) Model (1.A)
0.695 0.705
 
The Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions is not significant in any of the 
specifications above, which means that there is no evidence that the instruments used 
are invalid. AR (1) and AR (2) are the application of the autocorrelation tests developed 
in Arellano and Bond (1991) to check for first and second order autocorrelation in the 
residuals of the differenced equations. The fact that there is evidence of first order but 
not second order autocorrelation implies that the model is well specified in levels, as 
expected. Furthermore, the F-test for the null hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero 
is safely rejected in both models. 
Since the coefficient in CREDGi,t  is not found to be statistically significant, this 
variable is eliminated from the regression and analysis is focused in the reduced model 
(1.A)
19. 
                                                 
19 Even though the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is not signifficant when credit growth is 
controlled for, it is relevant in models that do not include CREDGi,t. This variable, on the other hand, has 
not shown to be signifficant even in specifications that do not include BUFi,t-1.   18 
Capital buffers are found to be persistent as the coefficient in BUFi,t-1 is significant and 
positive, thus presenting evidence in favour of the adjustment cost hypothesis. There is 
statistically weak evidence of a negative relationship between NPL1i,t and excess 
capital, which may suggest that this variable does not fully eliminate the ex-post 
character of the outstanding stock of non-performing loans or that credit risk is not a 
relevant determinant of banks’ capital buffers. This may be because the regulatory 
capital ratio already adjusts enough to cover the extra credit risk (which is unlikely) or 
because the precautionary effect of increasing capital buffers to cover credit risk is 
cancelled by the moral hazard and regulatory arbitrage effects described in Crocket, A. 
(1997) that actually lead more risky banks to hold less excess capital. 
The negative coefficient in PROVi,t presents evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
provisions are a substitute for capital buffers. The fact that banks with a higher weight 
of stocks in their total assets seem to hold higher capital buffers suggests that banks 
with higher exposure to market risk choose to hold more excess capital in order to cover 
for the excess risk not considered in the regulatory minimum requirements. As 
expected, a significant size effect is also found. However, no statistically significant 
effect of mergers is found, suggesting that mergers and acquisitions have not taken 
place at the expense of the overall system’s capital. 
Finally, as documented in the literature, a negative relationship between the output gap 
and capital buffers is found, which conveys that banks tend to cover the extra risk in 
cycle downturns with excess capital but also that the lending cycle may be pro-cyclical.  
7.1. Additional Hypotheses 
Since the variance of profits is a broad risk measure, the hypothesis that banks with 
higher and more stable profits require smaller capital buffers is tested on a model that   19 
does not include other risk measures. For increased robustness, income is measured 
both by ROA and by cash flow. Qualitatively, the conclusions are the same, confirming 
that banks with higher and less variable income do in fact tend to hold less excess 
capital. However, the coefficient in ROAi,t is statistically weaker than the one in CFi,t. 
The F-test for the hypothesis that both the coefficient in profitability and the one in 
profit volatility are zero is significant at 10% in model (a.1) and at 1% in model (a.2). 
Variable
BUFi,t-1 0.748 (11.76)*** 0.675 (7.82)*** 0.396 (1.92)* 0.358 (2.67)**
NPL1i,t -1.632 (-0.25) -5.589 (-1.31)
PROVi,t -0.986 (-2.32)** -0.640 (-1.24)
STKi,t 14.501 (1.99)* 11.586 (1.68)




VPROFi,t 8.614 (3.37)*** 4.972 (2.10)*
SIZEi,t -4.252 (-0.95) -9.230 (-1.93)* -15.896 (-3.24)*** -15.925 (-3.31)***
YGAPt -2.233 (-3.31)*** -2.001 (-3.29)***
MERGERi,t -6.662 (-0.91) -5.123 (-0.92) -3.799 (-0.43) 6.127 (0.45)





NOTES: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
p-values are reported for the Hansen, AR(1), AR(2) and F tests
***, ** and * indicate statistical signifficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively, 
in a two-tailed t-test.
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.896 0.983 0.469 0.209
0.023 0.020 0.046 0.061
0.513 0.695 0.557 0.529
Table 4.1 Additional Hypotheses - Profitability, Stock Market Growth Rate
Model (a.1) Model (a.2) Model (b.1) Model (b.2)
 
Tests for the relevance of the growth of the PSI General stock market index were 
conducted on a specification which does not include the output gap as stock market 
performance is strongly correlated with the business cycle
20. Statistically significant 
evidence of a positive effect of stock market performance in capital buffers was found, 
suggesting that banks tend to choose times of good stock market performance to issue 
new capital or that during these periods the value of banks’ capital is boosted by the 
likely increase in listed banks’ share price and the increase in profits from stock 
                                                 
20 Check the correlation matrix of the variables in the Appendix.   20 
holdings. These conclusions must, however, be interpreted with care, as the result may 
be spurious if changes in PSIGt do not cause changes in BUFi,t-1 but, on the other hand, 
changes in the output gap cause changes both in capital buffers and in stock market 
performance
21. If it is true that the positive impact of PSIGt in BUFi,t-1 is related to 
impacts in profits from banks’ holdings of stocks, one would expect the effect to be 
larger for banks with a higher weight of stocks in their total assets. The positive but not 
statistically significant coefficient in PSIG*STKi,t provides weak evidence for this 
hypothesis.  
Variable
BUFi,t-1 0.359 (2.68)** 0.377 (2.75)** 0.374 (2.59)** 0.365 (2.67)**
NPL1i,t -8.725 (-1.43) -8.440 (-2.00)* -8.295 (-2.14)** -3.778 (-0.70)
PROVi,t -1.010 (-2.55)** -1.103 (-3.34)*** -1.111 (-2.88)** -0.983 (-3.49)***
STKi,t 8.364 (1.89)* 15.681 (2.88)** 14.824 (2.99)*** 17.850 (4.18)***
ROEi,t -0.119 (-0.05)
TIER1i,t -0.524 (-0.44)
MKTDi,t 0.542 (1.04) -4.495 (-1.18)
MKTD*SIZEi,t 0.354 (1.33)
SIZEi,t -15.700 (-2.49)** -24.077 (-2.41)** -20.241 (-5.86)*** -36.963 (-2.75)**
YGAPt -1.650 (-2.72)** -1.917 (-3.07)*** -1.817 (-2.81)** -1.435 (-2.18)**
MERGERi,t -3.249 (-0.25) 5.693 (0.44) 5.743 (0.56) 1.635 (0.15)






p-values are reported for the Hansen, AR(1), AR(2) and F tests
Model (c) Model (d) Model (e.1) Model (e.2)
0.507 0.862 0.798 0.942
0.497
0.040 0.021 0.044 0.032
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
***, ** and * indicate statistical signifficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively, 
in a two-tailed t-test.
Table 4.2 Additional Hypotheses - Cost of Capital, Weight of Tier 1 Capital in Total Capital, 
Weight of Market Liabilities in Total Liabilities
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.524 0.664 0.585
 
No significant effect of the cost of capital, proxied by ROE, was found. This may be 
related to the fact that the cost of capital is an adjustment cost to the capital buffer, since 
these costs are already taken into consideration through the inclusion of the lagged 
                                                 
21 In fact, a regression of PSIGt on a constant and YGAPt-1 yields a significant coefficient on YGAPt-1 
whereas a regression of YGAPt on PSIGt-1 does not, suggesting that the business cycle determines stock 
market performance but the opposite is not true.   21 
dependent variable. Furthermore, ROEi,t is measured in book-values whereas the true 
cost of capital is related to the market value of banks’ return on equity
22. 
The negative but statistically weak effect of the ratio of Tier 1 to total capital provides 
weak evidence for the hypothesis presented in 5.1 d). Weak evidence is also found for 
the hypothesis that banks with a higher ratio of market to total debt hold higher capital 
buffers. Furthermore, this effect seems
23 to be present only in the 94% larger banks. 
Given the small sample size, it is reassuring to note that the sign and significance of 
most coefficients remains stable across a wide range of specifications
24. The effect of 
NPL1, however, is not robust to the different specifications, suggesting that either banks 
do not adjust their capital buffers to credit risk or this variable is still a poor proxy for 
expected credit risk. Possible differences between domestic and foreign owned banks 
were also investigated through the inclusion of a dummy variable. However, this feature 
has not shown to be relevant. 
8. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this study was investigating which factors determine Portuguese 
banks’ capital buffers, through the estimation of a dynamic panel data model. 
Observed persistence in capital buffers suggests that there are relevant adjustment costs 
in banks’ excess capital. On the other hand, high and stable profits and provisioning 
were found to be substitutes for capital buffers. 
                                                 
22 It is, however, impossible to compute banks’ market value return on equity, as there are no estimates 
for most Portuguese banks’ market value of equity. 
23 Evidence for this fact is once again weak as the hypothesis that both MKTD1i,t and MKTD*SIZEi,t are 
zero may not be rejected. 
24 In fact, estimation by Generalized Least Squares assuming Random Effects – the methodology used in 
Lindquist (2003) – provided the same qualitative results.   22 
A statistically weak and not robust negative credit risk effect was found, suggesting that 
the credit risk proxy used does not fully eliminate the ex-post character of the proxies 
used in the literature. The intuitive and reassuring result of a positive risk effect was 
found for broad measures of asset risk and for the weight of market liabilities. Hence, 
banks seem to cover for higher market risk with more excess capital. 
Weak evidence for the hypothesis that rating objectives have a positive effect on capital 
buffers, which had been previously discussed in the literature but not explicitly tested, 
was found. Weak evidence of a positive effect of stock market changes was also found. 
The hypothesis that larger banks hold less excess capital was confirmed, as was a 
negative business cycle effect which means that banks protect themselves when higher 
credit risk materializes, but also that their credit policy may amplify economic cycles. 
These findings allow for a better understanding of the factors underlying changes in 
Portuguese banks’ capital buffers as well as assessing their likely reactions to changes 
in regulation. For instance, the fact that banks already seem to adjust capital buffers to 
risk and business cycles, suggests that the impact on banks’ capital ratios of the more 
risk sensitive regulation proposed in Basel II may not be as large as feared, since it is 
likely that some of the volatility observed in capital buffers is transferred to capital 
requirements. The estimated impacts must not, however, be expected to hold in the 
future, as the new regulatory framework is likely to cause a structural break.   23 
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Correlation Matrix of Variables Included in Estimation
BUFi,t BUFi,t-1 NPL1i,t PROVi,t CREDGi,t STKi,t SIZEi,t YGAPt ROAi,t CFi,t VPROFi,t PSIGt PSIG*STKi,t ROEi,t FPBi,t MKTDi,t MKTD*SIZEi,t MERGERi,t
BUFi,t 1.000
BUFi,t-1 0.799 1.000
NPL1i,t 0.029 0.014 1.000
PROVi,t -0.398 -0.377 -0.040 1.000
CREDGi,t -0.136 0.030 0.033 0.134 1.000
STKi,t 0.228 0.169 -0.067 -0.203 -0.083 1.000
SIZEi,t -0.402 -0.388 -0.356 -0.031 -0.051 0.337 1.000
YGAPt -0.188 -0.047 -0.159 -0.057 0.267 -0.029 0.080 1.000
ROAi,t 0.386 0.294 0.240 0.137 -0.064 0.444 -0.331 -0.160 1.000
CFi,t 0.330 0.227 0.417 0.165 -0.012 0.371 -0.410 -0.176 0.893 1.000
VPROFi,t 0.282 0.230 0.191 0.157 -0.075 0.300 -0.306 -0.060 0.829 0.655 1.000
PSIGt 0.197 0.137 0.103 0.170 0.068 -0.060 -0.027 -0.613 0.023 0.006 -0.060 1.000
PSIG*STKi,t 0.317 0.212 0.080 0.026 -0.057 0.220 0.036 -0.529 0.186 0.157 0.110 0.738 1.000
ROEi,t 0.127 0.078 0.141 0.040 -0.037 0.323 0.069 -0.013 0.611 0.472 0.400 0.067 0.063 1.000
FPBi,t 0.373 0.392 0.139 -0.084 0.159 0.015 -0.582 -0.041 0.296 0.316 0.203 0.064 0.023 -0.085 1.000
MKTDi,t 0.367 0.215 -0.025 0.004 -0.180 0.267 -0.152 -0.208 0.429 0.465 0.288 -0.088 0.096 0.162 0.035 1.000
MKTD*SIZEi,t 0.266 0.122 -0.129 -0.028 -0.191 0.329 0.080 -0.180 0.308 0.327 0.187 -0.111 0.084 0.134 -0.112 0.969 1.000
MERGERi,t -0.139 -0.026 0.138 0.002 0.283 0.139 0.151 0.100 -0.057 0.010 0.006 -0.112 -0.185 -0.035 -0.017 -0.086 -0.054 1.000WORKING PAPERS
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